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HENLEY v. DILLARD DEPARTMENT STORES:
DON LOVES HIS HENLEY, AND HAS A RIGHT TO IT TOO
"[lt is common knowledge that many prominent persons ... would feel
sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements. "'
I. INTRODUCTION
As we approach the new millennium, we are aware of a vast subcul-
ture that modern society has developed based upon "celebrities" and their
lives. Capitalizing upon the popularity of our "stars," companies enter
into multi-million dollar contracts with celebrities to endorse various prod-
ucts. 2 With such a large sum of money changing hands, it is not surprising
that the legal world has become an important part of such transactions.
One aspect of these transactions that is of particular interest is the "right
of publicity" doctrine, which first appeared approximately fifty years ago.
3
The term "right of publicity" was introduced into the judicial system
with the Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.4 decision. Es-
1. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953).
2. One can simply turn on the television or open almost any magazine to see
examples of celebrity commercial power. There are Nike ads that feature many
sports celebrities, including Michael Jordan and numerous other NBA basketball
players, soccer stars such as Mia Hamm, athletes like Gabriel Reese and many
more. The American Express Card is another example, with commercials featur-
ing Jerry Seinfeld, Tiger Woods and other celebrities. Playstation, a video game
system, has advertisements featuring numerous sports stars. MCI has advertise-
ments featuring Michael Jordan, and AT&T features numerous stars in its adver-
tisements, including Paul Reiser. These are simply examples to show that celebrity
endorsement in advertisements is far from a rarity, but rather very common in
American society.
3. For a discussion of the evolution of the right of publicity, see infra notes 22-
37 and accompanying text.
4. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). In his opinion, Judge Frank reasoned:
[I]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in New
York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing
his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made "in gross." ... This
right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is common knowledge
that many prominent persons . . . far from having their feelings bruised
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if
they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, populariz-
ing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses [sic],
trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no
money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.
Id. at 868. It is interesting to note that the very circuit to develop the term would
later deny any protection under a common law idea of a right of publicity. See
(169)
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sentially, the right of publicity gives a person a property right in his or her
own publicity, and it also gives an individual the right to protect and con-
trol the use of his or her identity in the commercial sphere. 5 Today, the
idea of a right of publicity has gained independence and a general accept-
ance in the courts. 6 In modern times, the right of publicity is generally a
Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984) (al-
lowing only statutory right to privacy claim). The New York Court of Appeals
found that New York privacy statutes precluded recognition of a common law right
of publicity. See id. at 583 ("Since the 'right of publicity' is encompassed under the
Civil Rights Law as an aspect of the right of privacy, which ... is exclusively statu-
tory . . . . the plaintiff cannot claim an independent common-law right of
publicity.").
Most commentators and courts will agree that the decision in Haelen marked
the emergence of the right of publicity. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of
Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personal
ity, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 854 (1995) ("The right of publicity as currently under-
stood was the product of the determination of the Second Circuit in Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc."); H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commer-
cial Exploitation of Identity: A New Age for the Right of Publicity, 17 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. &
ARTS 1, 2 (1992) ("The court suggested the label, 'right of publicity,' and by so
doing, provided the legal theory that would help empower celebrities in the
emerging economic sphere being created by the entertainment, media and adver-
tising industries."); Steven C. Clay, Note, Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity
Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REv. 485, 489 (1994) (noting
Haelen court coined term "right of publicity" and was "the first case to explicitly
recognize that a celebrity's name or likeness has value beyond a right of privacy").
5. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992)
(discussing right of celebrity to control commercial value of identity); Carson v.
Here'sJohnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The right
of publicity has developed to protect the commercial interest of celebrities in their
identities."); Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824-25
(9th Cir. 1974) (noting right of individual to control commercial use of identity);
Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (discuss-
ing purpose of right of publicity); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431
(Cal. 1979) ("The so-called right of publicity means in essence that the reaction of
the public to name and likeness, which may be fortuitous or which may be man-
aged or planned, endows the name and likeness of the person involved with com-
mercially exploitable opportunities."); see also Barbara A. Burnett, The Property Right
of Publicity and the First Amendment: Popular Culture and the Commercial Persona, 3
HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 171, 173 (1990) (discussing right of publicity); Richard S.
Robinson, Preemption, the Right of Publicity, and a New Federal Statute, 16 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 183, 184 (1998) (same). See generally 1J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE
RiGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (4th ed. 1999) (discussing right of publicity).
6. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977)
(recognizing existence of right of publicity); Halpern, supra note 4, at 853 (discuss-
ing recognition of right in value of identity). Halpern concludes:
The Haelan opinion's recognition of a proprietary interest in personality
and the analytic work done over four decades adumbrate a right that is
predicated on significant societal interests and concerns. It is not hap-
penstance that the right of publicity has come to be articulated in the
Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition. There is, at bottom, recogni-
tion of the fact that there is something wrong, a manifest "unfairness,"
when one person seeks to trade on the personality of another.
Id. at 873; see Burnett, supra note 5, at 180-81 ("[B]y the mid-1950's the distinct
forms of injury arising from the privacy tort and the publicity tort were recognized,
[Vol. 45: p. 169
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celebrity-based cause of action. 7 The right of publicity has been described
as "the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial
use of his or her identity."'8 Currently, over twenty states recognize
and the potential commercial loss as a basis of publicity rights was distinguished
from psychological distress as a basis for a privacy tort action."); Patricia B. Frank,
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.: The Right of Publicity Spins its Wheels,
55 OIo ST. L.J. 1115, 1115 (1994) ("Since the 1950s, American law has recog-
nized a property right in a person's publicity as 'the right of each person to control
and profit from the publicity values which he has created."') (quoting Melville B.
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 (1954)).
7. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting
right of publicity most often involves celebrity); Carson, 698 F.2d at 835 (discussing
right in terms of celebrities); Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 824-25 (same); Frank,
supra note 6, at 1116-17 (same); Robinson, supra note 5, at 184 (discussing right as
developed in response to needs of celebrities); Gary M. Ropski & Diane L. Mar-
schang, The Stars' Wars: Names, Pictures and Lookalikes, 17 AIPLA QJ. 81, 82 (1989)
("Generally, the right of publicity exists to protect a 'celebrity' from another per-
son's commercial exploitation of that celebrity's 'fame."'). Although Ropski and
Marschang state that the right of publicity generally protects celebrities, they note:
Obvious questions arise concerning the right of publicity, specifically,
who is a celebrity and what degree of fame is required for someone to
achieve celebrity status. Any person famous or well-known in his or her
field of endeavor may be a celebrity, including entertainers, athletes, poli-
ticians, and even lawyers. The degree of fame a celebrity must have is a
much more difficult issue ....
Id. at 82. Interestingly, they note that it is unresolved "whether the right of public-
ity should be available to someone who has attained his or her notoriety through
immoral or criminal activities." Id. at 83. In today's society, it seems that equal, or
even greater, media exposure is given to individuals who could be described as
participants in "immoral" or "criminal" activities. Just a few of the many examples
are the "Unabomber" Ted Kazinski, or Heidi Flice, the Hollywood call-girl ring-
leader, and perhaps even Monica Lewinski, with whom President Bill Clinton en-
gaged in an extra-marital affair. The line between fame and notoriety is not as
sharp as it once was. As a result, the outcome of right of publicity claims brought
by those individuals who fall into the gray area, is even less certain than claims
brought by admitted "celebrities." See id. Yet as Ropski and Marschang noted,
"There is no case law in the United States that directly addresses the right of pub-
licity as applied to infamous public figures." Id.
Halpern notes that although some commentators debate as to whether the
status of "celebrity" is necessary, "in practice that debate is largely academic." Hal-
pern, supra note 4, at 854. The right of publicity is generally reserved for celebri-
ties. See id; see also Hetherington, supra note 4, at 45-47 (discussing status of
"celebrity"). As many have noted, Hetherington agrees that the right of publicity
raises "the obvious question: Who is a celebrity in the eyes of the law?" Id. at 45.
Hetherington argues that this question is not hard to answer and that "anyone
whose identity commands value in the commercial marketplace should qualify for
protection under the 'direct commercial exploitation of identity' test." Id. at 46.
Like Halpern's reasoning, Hetherington feels that "[t]o start drawing lines and
creating judicial tests for celebrity status is an unnecessary exercise." Id.
8. J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute,
34 UCLA L. REv. 1703, 1704 (1987); see McCARTH-, supra note 5, § 1.1, at 1-2 (de-
fining right of publicity as right to control commercial aspects of identity); Ste-
phen M. Lobbin, The Right(s) of Publicity in California: Is Three Really Greater Than
One?, 2 UCLA Er. L. REv. 157, 158 (1995) (noting "the individual's commercial
interest in persona ... [is] consistently labeled the 'right of publicity."').
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a right of publicity in some form.9 Although the Supreme Court has
confirmed the existence of a right of publicity, 10 the boundaries of
this right continue to be a source of contention among courts and
commentators.'1 Some are willing to expand the right to include
many forms of publicity promotions, 12 while others are reluctant
9. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West 1997) (recognizing right of publicity); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1997) (same); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (West
1994) (same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1997) (same); see also MCCARTHY,
supra note 5, § 6.2, at 6-10 (providing information regarding number of state stat-
utes creating right of publicity). States that have recognized the right of publicity
under common law include: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illi-
nois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah
and Wisconsin. See id. § 6.1, at 6-7 to 6-8 (listing states with common law recogni-
tion of right); see also Clay, supra note 4, at 493 (noting number of states recogniz-
ing right); Lisa M. Ferri & Robert G. Gibbons, Outside Counsel, Skirting the Right of
Publicity in the Wake of'Hoffman v. Capital Cities,' 221 N.Y.L.J. 37 (Feb. 1999) (stat-
ing that over half of states recognize right by statute or common law). See generally
James Barr Haines, First Amendment II: Developments in the Right of Publicity, 1189
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211 (1989) (discussing current right of publicity statutes). In his
article, Haines discusses right of publicity statutes as they stood in 1989. See id. at
212. He separates the state statutes into those that are narrowly drawn and broadly
drawn, and he identifies a few of the identity characteristics protected by each. See
id. at 215-21 (discussing in detail statutes concerning right).
10. See generally Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562 (discussing and recognizing right of
publicity).
11. See, e.g., Halpern, supra note 4, at 873 ("The complex questions, such as
those raised by White v. Samsung, and the unsettled boundary at the interface of
evocation and appropriation, require continuing efforts to articulate principled
bases for both the limitations and the expansion of the right."); Lobbin, supra note
8, at 158 (arguing that right of publicity in California is disjointed and unclear);
Hetherington, supra note 4, at 15 ("[T]he debate over publicity rights has shifted
from non-recognition to definition of the scope and duration of protection.");
Ropski & Marschang, supra note 7, at 99 ("Despite the rather large number of
court decisions in the United States involving publicity right issues, it is clear that
the right of publicity remains an 'amorphous' right. Both the courts and legisla-
tures have failed to produce uniform standards of guidelines to establish a well-
defined right of publicity."); David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away:
The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673, 675 (1981)
(" [T] he definition of the right of publicity remains unclear; its theory is still evolv-
ing and its limits are uncertain."); Clay, supra note 4, at 487 (arguing that right of
publicity has gone too far). But see Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy,
Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1589 (1979)
(noting apparent consistency in defining right in courts and by commentators).
For a further discussion of examples where the boundaries of the right of publicity
are unclear or different, see infra notes 143-66 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810-12 (9th Cir. 1997)
(allowing right of publicity claim involving animatronic robots allegedly based on
actors' likenesses); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th
Cir. 1992) (recognizing viable right of publicity claim where robot used in adver-
tisement), rehg denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
(1993); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing
claim involving voice misappropriation); Carson, 698 F.2d at 835 (allowing com-
mon law right of publicity claim where Johnny Carson's signature "The Tonight
Show" introduction, "Here's Johnny," used without his permission); Mot-
schenbacher, 498 F.2d at 827 (allowing claim where photograph of plaintiff's race
[Vol. 45: p. 169
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to recognize the right of publicity as an independent area of the
law. 1
3
This Note argues that the law within the judicial system concerning
the right of publicity is contradictory and confused, and there is a need for
a federal right of publicity statute to provide circuit courts with guidelines
and boundaries for this elusive area of the law.1 4 Henley v. Dillard Depart-
ment Stores' 5 illustrates the current status of the right in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and demonstrates the expansive
boundaries that some courts are willing to apply to the right of publicity.1 6
Other circuits either do not recognize the right at all or apply different
standards and/or boundaries. 17 Part II of this Note discusses the develop-
ment of the right of publicity and its acceptance as a legal concept.' 8 Part
III presents the Fifth Circuit's approach in Henley as representative of the
expansive approach to the right of publicity.19 Part IV discusses the im-
pact of the Henley opinion and also explores how the various applications
of the right of publicity by different circuit courts is creating confusion
and divergence in the law surrounding this right.20 Part V of this Note
proposes that a federal right of publicity statute is necessary to bring uni-
formity to this amorphous area of the law. 21
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. The Right to Privacy Gave Rise to the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity has strong roots in the right to privacy, a right
that developed in the late nineteenth century and was first discussed in an
car used in television commercial, but neither plaintiff's name nor likeness used);
Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (enjoining magazine
from distributing magazines containing nude portrayal of plaintiff).
13. See, e.g., Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir.
1998) (discussing right to privacy versus right of publicity and only allowing Ala-
bama privacy tort protection to limited cases of identity appropriation); Oliveira v.
Frito-Lay Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1455, 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing only limited
right to privacy under New York law).
14. For a further discussion of the need for a federal statute, see infra notes
198-216 and accompanying text.
15. 46 F. Supp. 2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
16. See generally id.
17. See, e.g., Oliveira, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1462 (recognizing only limited privacy
right under New York law); Cheatham v. Paisano Publications, Inc., 891 F. Supp.
381 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (recognizing right of publicity only as offshoot of privacy
doctrine).
18. For a further discussion of the development and acceptance of the right
of publicity, see infra notes 22-133 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the Fifth Circuit's expansive approach to the
right of publicity, see infra notes 134-79 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the impact of HenLey and the divergence in the
law surrounding the right of publicity, see infra notes 134-79 and accompanying
text.
21. For a further discussion of the author's view that federal statutory gui-
dance is needed, see infra notes 198-216 and accompanying text.
2000] NOTE
5
Johnson: Henley v. Dillard Department Stores: Don Loves His Henley, and Ha
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.22 The article defined the
right to privacy as "the right to be let alone." 23 The right focused on the
injured feelings of an individual whose private life was exposed against his
or her will, and was therefore more of a mental anguish than a property-
based tort.24 Because privacy law focused upon the "right to be let alone,"
celebrity plaintiffs, as the focus of much media attention already, did not
find much relief under privacy law. 25 Although there were different varia-
22. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890) (discussing right to privacy doctrine).
23. Id. at 193.
24. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d
959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting source of right of publicity is law of privacy, but
it is business right to control identity in commerce rather than personal right to
maintain privacy); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("The
[right of privacy] has been characterized as establishing and limiting the right of a
person 'to be left alone' and protecting 'the sentiments, thoughts and feelings of
an individual . . . from [unwanted] commercial exploitation."') (quoting Flores v.
Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 280 (N.Y. 1959)); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603
P.2d 425, 437 (Cal. 1979) ("The appropriation of [persona] ... intrudes on inter-
ests distinctly different than those protected by the right of privacy."); Cabaniss v.
Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 504 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (distinguishing between privacy
rights and "an appropriation of rights in the nature of property rights for commer-
cial exploitation"); see also 4J. THOMAS MCCARTHX', MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:6, at 28-8 (4th ed. 1999) (discussing difference between
privacy and publicity rights). McCarthy states:
The appropriation type of invasion of privacy, like all privacy rights, cen-
ters on damage to human dignity. Damages are usually measured by
'mental distress'- some bruising of the human psyche. On the other
hand, the right of publicity relates to commercial damage to the business
value of human identity. Put simplistically, while infringement of the
right to publicity looks to an injury to the pocketbook, an invasion of
appropriation privacy looks to an injury to the psyche.
Id.; see Burnett, supra note 5, at 174-75 (discussing role of injury to emotions in
privacy law). Burnett reasons that privacy doctrine did not take into account com-
mercial concerns relating to an individual's persona because society did not have
the curiosity and obsession that it has today with stars and their lives. See id. at 175
(noting when privacy doctrine was developed, commercial value of media exploita-
tion of celebrities and their lives was not contemplated).
25. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 967; see, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167
(5th Cir. 1941) (finding no damages where defendant brewery published picture
of plaintiff, who was professional football player). In O'Brien, the plaintiff was a
famous college football player who claimed an invasion of privacy because of his
participation in programs that discouraged alcohol abuse in minors. See id. at 169.
O'Brien had actively sought national publicity through his college's publicity de-
partment, and the court found that this self-promotion amounted to a waiver of his
right to privacy. See id. (determining O'Brien did not have right to privacy); see also
Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (W.D. Okla.
1938) (holding that Ohio right of privacy did not extend to prominent, notorious
or well known persons); Frank, supra note 6, at 1116-17 (discussing inadequacies of
privacy doctrine as relating to celebrities); Robinson, supra note 5, at 184 ("Embar-
rassment or humiliation was often difficult to demonstrate where the celebrities
had suffered no mental anguish when subjected to publicity."); Clay, supra note 4,
at 488 ("Some courts were reluctant to apply privacy rights to celebrities, stating
that celebrities waived any right 'to be let alone' through their active pursuit of
and profit from fame.").
[Vol. 45: p. 169
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tions of the right to sue for invasion of privacy, all forms focused upon the
personal dignity of the individual.2 6
As celebrity status began to gain more commercial and economic
value, it became apparent to commentators and courts alike that privacy
law was inadequate. 27 Melville Nimmer, a well-known legal commentator,
was one of the first to suggest a theory based on a right of publicity, and he
described it as the "right of each person to control and profit from the
publicity values which he has created or purchased."28 Nimmer's article
helped to lay the foundation for a right of publicity by observing that ce-
lebrities do not truly seek privacy.2 9 He stated:
Well known personalities connected with these industries [in-
cluding the advertising, motion picture, television and radio] do
not seek the "solitude and privacy" which Brandeis and Warren
sought to protect. Indeed, privacy is the one thing they do "not
want, or need." Their concern is rather with publicity, which
may be regarded as the reverse side of the coin of privacy. How-
ever, although the well known personality does not wish to hide
his light under a bushel of privacy, neither does he wish to have
his name, photograph, and likeness reproduced and publicized
without his consent or without remuneration to him.30
William Prosser, another legal commentator, was also integral to the
development of the right of publicity.31 In his influential article on pri-
vacy law, Prosser divided the right of privacy into four separate torts: "In-
trusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs;
There were a few cases that, under privacy law, did recognize the commercial
viability of one's name and likeness. See Hetherington, supra note 4, at 5 (discuss-
ing Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540 (1891), and Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg.
Co., 67 A. 392 (N.J. Ch. 1907), as two examples where courts recognized value of
individual's name or likeness). Hetherington goes on to state: "[d]espite these
early indications that the commercial value of name and likeness had protectable
attributes of property, most courts were reluctant to protect individuals who sur-
rendered their privacy in the active search for notoriety." Id.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 cmt. a (1977) (laying down
right to privacy framework); see also Robinson, supra note 5, at 184-85 (noting per-
sonal nature of law of privacy).
27. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
203, 203 (1954) (discussing inadequacies of privacy law doctrine); Robinson, supra
note 5, at 184 ("The right of publicity was conceived as a solution to the problems
caused when celebrities attempted to use the right of privacy, and/or the tort of
appropriation, to protect pecuniary interests.").
28. Nimmer, supra note 27, at 216.
29. See id. at 203-04.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Burnett, supra note 5, at 176 (discussing Prosser and origins of
publicity right in privacy doctrine); Robinson, supra note 5, at 185 (stating Pros-
ser's right of privacy framework "spurred discussion of the creation of a separate
right of publicity"); Clay, supra note 4, at 490 (noting Prosser as "universally cited
in publicity cases").
7
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Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; Publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; Appropriation,
for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name or likeness. '32
Under the last test, the tort of appropriation, Prosser discussed a right of
publicity. 33 Many courts and commentators look to this discussion as "one
of the earliest and most enduring articulations of the common law right of
publicity cause of action. '34 In his discussion, Prosser separated the mis-
appropriation tort from the others by stating that it was more of a proprie-
tary tort than mental anguish. 35 Therefore, the right of publicity can be
seen to have strong roots in privacy doctrine.3 6 Today, the law concerning
the right is still developing, and many of its property characteristics are
unsettled within the courts.
3 7
B. The Underlying Policies Justifying the Right of Publicity
It is an undisputed fact that a celebrity's identity is regularly associ-
ated with economic value.38 There are several theories as to why an indi-
32. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
33. See id. at 406-07 (discussing right of publicity). In his discussion, Prosser
focused on name and likeness appropriations. See id. at 400. He noted, however,
that it might be extended beyond this realm: "[i]t is not impossible that there
might be appropriation of the plaintiff's identity, as by impersonation, without the
use of either his name or his likeness, and that this would be an invasion of his
right of privacy." Id. at 397-98. Prosser discussed the idea of a right of publicity in
terms of privacy law doctrine. See id. at 393 (using language of privacy rights).
34. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992),
reh' denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993); see
Burnett, supra note 5, at 175-76 (discussing Prosser's theories on privacy doctrine
as spurring creation of right of publicity).
35. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 389 (discussing property aspects of misappro-
priation). From early on, courts recognized the property aspects of an individual's
identity. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("The
distinctive aspect of the common law right of publicity is that it recognizes the
commercial value of the picture or representation of a prominent person or per-
former, and protects his proprietary interest in the profitability of his public repu-
tation or 'persona."'); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D.
Minn. 1970) (classifying identity of celebrity as type of property); see also Ropski &
Marschang, supra note 7, at 82 ("Unlike the right of privacy which is strictly a per-
sonal right, the right of publicity has acquired many attributes of a property
right.").
36. See Hetherington, supra note 4, at 4 ("The seeds of celebrity rights lay in
the novel doctrine of privacy."). For a further discussion of the evolution of the
right of publicity from privacy doctrine, see supra notes 22-37 and accompanying
text.
37. This Note will focus mainly on the scope of protection offered by the right
of publicity in the different circuits, and not on such facets as inheritability of the
right.
38. See White, 971 F.2d at 1399 ("Advertisers use celebrities to promote their
products. The more popular the celebrity, the greater the number of people who
recognize her, and the greater the visibility for the product."); Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating celebrity's
identity is valuable in promotion of products); see also Burnett, supra note 5, at 172
(noting economic value associated with famous people); Halpern, supra note 4, at
8
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vidual should be able to protect his or her own public identity.3 9 A
number of courts have taken the position that the individual has spent a
lot of time, effort and perhaps money to achieve the status of being fa-
mous. 40 Therefore, "[c] elebrities have a moral claim under this justifica-
857-58 (discussing marketable value associated with celebrity identity); Lobbin,
supra note 8, at 157 (noting celebrity endorsement of products as lucrative industry
for celebrities). As H. Lee Hetherington eloquently stated:
By the 1970s, the stage was set for an unprecedented product and market-
ing explosion. Initially, it meant a proliferation of entertainment
software: television programming, sports, movies, videos, magazines and
music. This new national capability for mass marketing combined with
improved means of product distribution and increased consumer de-
mand in turn ushered in a flurry of new consumer products, all calcu-
lated to make modern life complete, especially for the newly affluent,
younger consumer. Manufacturers became increasingly eager to link
their products to a recognizable celebrity face, voice or body that would
be appropriately drinking, singing, sweating or jumping, but always
selling.
Hetherington, supra note 4, at 2-3.
39. See, e.g., Haines, supra note 9, at 214-15 (discussing three underlying poli-
cies of right); Lobbin, supra note 8, at 174 ("There have been several policy argu-
ments consistently set forth by both courts and commentators in favor of the right
of publicity-namely, moral, economic, distributional, and consumer protection
justifications for recognizing the right."); Clay, supra note 4, at 491-93 (discussing
various justifications for right of publicity). Haines notes the policies as follows:
"The right of publicity (1) recognizes the economic value of one's identity; (2) acts
as an incentive to creativity by encouraging the production of entertaining and
intellectual works; and (3) prevents the unjust enrichment of those who usurp the
identity of another." Haines, supra note 9, at 214-15. But see Memphis Dev. Found.
v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980) (arguing that fame is not
always due to celebrity's hard work). The court stated: "Fame often is fortuitous
and fleeting. It always depends on the participation of the public in the creation
of an image. It usually depends on the communication of information about the
famous person by the media." Id.; see Clay, supra note 4, at 501-06 (arguing that
traditional justifications for right of publicity are unjustified). In arguing against
the property rationale, Clay states:
The property rationale . . . ignores two factors: first, many unknown en-
tertainers expend similar resources developing abilities that are equal to
or better than those of celebrities, and never receive the compensation
this exclusive right bestows only on those already famous. More impor-
tantly, the property rationale fails to account for the serendipitous and
unpredictable influence of the public and media on who becomes a
celebrity.
Id. at 502. Clay also argues against the market saturation rationale, the economic
incentive justification and the theory that a celebrity's identity would be rendered
valueless. See id. at 504-06 (arguing justifications do not withstand analysis). He
states: "Those who posit the incentive argument would have us believe that the
million dollar salary of an NBA draft pick (or other entertainer) is not enough to
ensure an adequate flow of talent into this field. This argument assumes that only
the addition of the shoe endorsement contract will attract the correct mix of abil-
ity." Id. at 505-06; see Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127, 134 (1993) (criticizing traditional
justification arguments, even stating "I hope ... to reopen the question of whether
the right of publicity should exist at all .... ").
40. See, e.g., White, 971 F.2d at 1399 ("Considerable energy and ingenuity are
expended by those who have achieved celebrity value to exploit it for profit. The
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tion to any money flowing from their fame, and those evoking this identity
are free riders on the celebrity's gravy train."4 1 Courts, in using this justifi-
cation, generally reason that they are trying to prevent "unjust
enrichment."
42
Others, including the Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 43 have viewed protection of one's public identity as pro-
viding a type of "economic incentive."44 The Court reasoned that an indi-
vidual has a right to "reap the reward of his endeavors." 45 This argument
is closely related to the purposes underlying copyright and patent law.
46
law protects the celebrity's sole right to exploit this value whether the celebrity has
achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a combination thereof.");
Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1282 ("A celebrity must be considered to have invested
his years of practice and competition in a public personality which eventually may
reach marketable status. That identity, embodied in his name, likeness, statistics
and other personal characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and is a type of prop-
erty."); Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Ct. App. 1983) ("Often
considerable money, time and energy are needed to develop the ability in a per-
son's name or likeness to attract attention and evoke a desired response in a partic-
ular consumer market.").
41. Clay, supra note 4, at 491; see Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425,
441 (Cal. 1979) (discussing moral justification of right).
42. Lobbin, supra note 8, at 174. As Lobbin notes:
[M]ost courts explicitly stated that they were trying to prevent 'unjust
enrichment' of those who would make an unauthorized appropriation of
the value of an individual's persona for their own commercial advantage.
When this is done, the courts reasoned, the user is 'usurp[ing] both
profit and control of that individual's public image.'
Id. at 176 (quoting Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 441).
43. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
44. Id. at 576. The Court stated:
Ohio's decision to protect petitioner's right of publicity here rests on
more than a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort
invested in his act; the protection provides an economic incentive for him
to make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to
the public.
Id.
45. Id. at 573.
46. See, e.g., id. at 576 (discussing protection under copyright and patent law);
see also Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Player Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663,
679 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting common interest served by copyright law and right of
publicity), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987). The Seventh Circuit noted that in
Zacchini:
[T]he Supreme Court recognized that the interest behind federal copy-
right protection is the advancement of the public welfare through the
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain, and that a state's
interest in affording a cause of action for violation of the right to public-
ity "is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law."
Id. (quoting Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573); see Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, rehg denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984) (explaining rationale
underlying intellectual property law). The Court in Sony noted:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlim-
ited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather,
the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may
be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
[Vol. 45: p. 169
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Included in both copyright and patent law, and the economic incentive
theory of a right of publicity, is the belief that if the economic value of an
individual's identity was protected, people would be encouraged to under-
take more activities that would benefit society.
47
A third theory is based on the reasoning that if others were able to
benefit from a celebrity's identity without having to compensate the indi-
vidual, it would in a sense render that person's identity valueless. 48 There-
fore, a celebrity would lose a substantial part of his or her income.
4 9
Finally, one should be aware that a number of other theories exist that
justify a right of publicity.50
inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive
control has expired.
Id.; see Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428. The California Supreme Court noted:
The tie-up of one's name, face and/or likeness with a business, product
or service creates a tangible and saleable product in much the same way
as property may be created by one who organizes under his name a busi-
ness to build and/or sell houses according to a fixed plan or who writes a
book, paints a picture or creates an invention.
Id.
47. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 577 (stating "[t] he Constitution does not prevent
Ohio from making a similar choice here in deciding to protect the entertainer's
incentive [by allowing right of publicity claim] in order to encourage the produc-
tion of this type of work"); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir.
1994) ("Protecting one's name or likeness from misappropriation is socially bene-
ficial because it encourages people to develop special skills, which then can be
used for commercial advantage."); McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2.2, at 2-10 to 2-13
(discussing economic incentive aspect of right of publicity).
48. See Matthews, 15 F.3d at 437-38 (discussing commercial over-exploitation
of identity as diminishing value of identity); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,
280 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Wis. 1979) ("The economic damage caused by unauthorized
commercial use of a name [may include] the dilution of the value of the name in
authorized advertising."); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 3.3, at 43 (4th ed. 1992). One commentator stated:
It might seem that creating a property right in such use would not lead to
any socially worthwhile investment but would simply enrich already
wealthy celebrities. However, whatever information value a celebrity's en-
dorsement has to consumers will be lost if every advertiser can use the
celebrity's name and picture .... [T]he value of associating the celeb-
rity's name with a particular product will be diminished if others are per-
mitted to use the name in association with their products.
Id.; see Clay, supra note 4, at 492-93 ("Another argument holds that unauthorized
use of a celebrity's identity saturates the market, thus injuring the celebrity by re-
ducing demand for his or her image. This reasoning deems celebrities as com-
modities whose value will wither from overexposure.").
49. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953) (finding that celebrity has monetary interest in his or her celebrity
status).
50. See generally Lobbin, supra note 8, at 174-84 (discussing in depth numerous
theories of justifications for right of publicity); Clay, supra note 4, at 491-93 (dis-
cussing justifications for right). In addition to noting the moral and economic
justifications for the right of publicity, Lobbin goes on to suggest justifications that
are not as widely argued and lists various justifications. See Lobbin, supra note 8, at
174-84. For instance, he states "[p]lacing the right of publicity in the individual is
11
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C. Supreme Court Recognition of a Right of Publicity
It was not until the Supreme Court's decision in Zacchini that it be-
came clear that the right of publicity had gained solid judicial accept-
ance. 5 1 In Zacchini, the Supreme Court determined that a performer's
right of publicity had been violated when his entire "human cannonball"
act was broadcast on a local news program. 52 While performing at a
county fair in Ohio, Zacchini's act was filmed without his:permission and
later aired in its entirety on a newscast. 53 Zacchini alleged an "unlawful
appropriation of [his] professional property."54 The Supreme Court rec-
ognized that Zacchini had a right of publicity, and that it had been vio-
lated.5 5 In its determination, the Court held that broadcasting the "entire
performance... [went] to the heart of [Zacchini's] ability to earn a living
as an entertainer."5 6 Therefore, the broadcast was found to be a substan-
tial threat to Zacchini's economic interest in the performance. 57 In it's
holding, the Court recognized the need for a right of publicity cause of
action. 58 After Zacchini, the right of publicity was accepted on a much
partly justified by asserting that it will result in the most economically efficient
allocation of resources." Id. at 178. Contained within this justification is the the-
ory that as between a commercial user that wishes to profit from an association
with a celebrity, and the celebrity himself, the commercial user would be in the
better position to monetarily obtain the right to use the individual's identity. See
id. at 178-79 (discussing theories of right of publicity). Lobbin argues:
The commercial user of persona ... is usually well-positioned to conduct
an efficient transaction to "buy out" the right of publicity from the indi-
vidual. The user most likely knows whose persona is being appropriated,
and the user also has a good idea of the commercial value generated by
that use, and therefore how much the user would be willing to pay to buy
out the right of publicity from the individual. Consequently, a transac-
tion for the transfer of the right only involves locating the individual and
reaching an agreement, such as a license to use a celebrity's persona.
Id. at 179.
Lobbin also makes the argument that as between a commercial user of per-
sona and a celebrity, the distributional considerations of wealth favor the celebrity.
See id. at 180 (noting cost of being deprived of right would be greater for individual
celebrity). He argues that the commercial user would be "harmed less by not hav-
ing the right" and could spread the costs of obtaining the right more easily than
the cost falling on an individual. Id. The last justification for the right that Lobbin
sets forth is that by having the right in the individual, irrational consumer choices
would be discouraged. See id. at 181-82.
51. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 562.
52. See id. at 565-66 (finding violation of petitioner's right of publicity).
53. See id. at 564 (describing facts of case).
54. Id.
55. See id. at 574-76 (finding no defense justified violation of right of
publicity).
56. Id. at 576.
57. See id. (discussing damage to petitioner's interest).
58. See id. at 573 (discussing right of publicity versus "false light" privacy ac-
tions); see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1099-100 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[T]he Court itself recognized the authority of states to protect entertainers'
[Vol. 45: p. 169
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wider scale within the courts.5 9 Unfortunately, the Court's analysis of the
right of publicity in Zacchini was far from comprehensive and left open the
question of how courts should define the right and determine its limits.60
Because the Court did not definitively state when the right of publicity
should apply, recognition of the right has been far from uniform in the
lower courts.6 1
D. Application of the Right in Courts Today
At least twenty-four states recognize the right of publicity.62 Some
states have even enacted statutes recognizing this right.63 Others rely on
common law to protect an individual's right of publicity.64 Still other
states do not explicitly recognize a right of publicity, but have privacy law
provisions that sometimes protect a celebrity's identity. 65
'right of publicity' in [Zacchini]."), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080 (1993); Robinson,
supra note 5, at 187-88 (discussing Supreme Court recognition of right).
59. See Frank, supra note 6, at 1119 (noting widespread judicial acceptance of
right did not come about until Supreme Court recognition).
60. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 188 (noting Supreme Court holding involv-
ing right was limited); Ropski & Marschang, supra note 7, at 84 ("The United
States Supreme Court has not spoken comprehensively on the right of publicity.").
61. For a further discussion of different approaches taken by the courts, see
supra notes 58-60, infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Courts are divided on
many issues, including inheritability and descendibility of the right, and use of fair
use defenses. For an in-depth discussion of these subjects of controversy, see Rop-
ski & Marschang, supra note 7 (discussing cases with different approaches to these
subjects). Some courts, including those in the Ninth Circuit, are beginning to
expand protection to areas including voice imitation, and a broadening of protec-
tion under "look-alikes." For a further discussion of these trends, see infra notes
143-67 and accompanying text.
62. See McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 6.2, at 6-6 (stating at least 27 states recog-
nize right); see also Clay, supra note 4, at 493 (noting number of states recognizing
right); Ferri & Gibbons, supra note 9, at 8 (stating more than half of states have
recognized right by statute or common law).
63. For examples of such statutes, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir.
1998) ("We read Alabama's commercial appropriation privacy right... to repre-
sent the same interests and address the same harms as does the right of publicity as
customarily defined."). States that have recognized the right of publicity under
common law are: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and Wis-
consin. See McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 6.1, at 6-7 to 6-8 (listing states with common
law right).
65. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie 1984); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. CH. 214, § 3A (West 1986); NEB. REv. STAT. §§20-202, 25-840.01 (1991); N.Y.
Civ. RiGHTs LAW, §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, §§ 839.1-
839.3 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-28 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101
to 1108 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-40 (Michie 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50
(West 1983).
As illustrated by a number of cases, however, these privacy statutes do not
always protect right of publicity claims that would be afforded protection in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Allison, 136 F.3d at 1447 (discussing right to privacy versus
right of publicity and only allowing Alabama privacy tort protection to limited
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Currently, there is no federal statute that focuses on the right of pub-
licity, nor is there a definitive Supreme Court decision dealing with the
right of publicity that could help guide courts.66 Therefore different cir-
cuits, following varying language in state statutes or common law, differ in
what they believe is actually protected under the right of publicity.6 7
The issue that most courts struggle with is exactly how much protec-
tion an individual's identity should have. 68 In some instances, the scope
of protection has slowly broadened to include not only "name or likeness,"
but also to protect almost any appropriation of identity.69 In the new Re-
statement of the Law of Unfair Competition,7 0 the right of publicity has
been dealt with as an appropriation of "the commercial value of a person's
identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other
indicia of identity."7 1 The comments clearly reject limiting the right to
merely "name or likeness":
cases of identity appropriation); Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1455,
1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (disallowing voice misappropriation claim); Allen v. Nat'l
Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussing New York statute
requirement of "'portrait or picture' of individual, not merely the suggestion of
some aspect of person's public persona").
66. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(addressing right of publicity). Although the Court in Zacchini recognized the
existence of a right of publicity, it did not engage in a comprehensive analysis of
the right. See id. (discussing right of publicity as allowed by Ohio law).
67. See, e.g., Burnett, supra note 5, at 181 (noting differences in application);
Ropski & Marschang, supra note 7, at 83 (discussing various statutes and common
law approaches).
68. See, e.g., Clay, supra note 4, at 486-87 (arguing that right of publicity as
applied in White is too expansive). Clay argues that "the rush to protect all aspects
of celebrity identity has proceeded with little or no critical judicial analysis." Id. at
486. He focuses upon the decision reached in White as an example of the extremes
that courts have gone to, and should never have reached. See Ropski & Marschang,
supra note 7, at 82 (discussing ambiguity of right). Commentators Ropski and Mar-
schang note that the law surrounding the "right of publicity" is far from a static
field, with numerous issues involving the nature and scope of the right. See id.
(noting uncertainties inherent in current recognition of right). They note:
"Courts and legislatures have attempted to resolve the issues, but their attempts
have only resulted in conflicting court decisions and ambiguous statutory language
concerning the basic principles underlying the right." Id. Further, "[o]bvious
questions arise concerning the right of publicity, specifically, who is a celebrity and
what degree of fame is required for someone to achieve celebrity status." Id.
69. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.
1992) (allowing right of publicity for mechanical robot imitation), rehg denied, 989
F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993); Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing voice misappropriation as viola-
tion of right of publicity); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(enjoining magazine from distributing copies of magazine that included "repre-
sentational" drawing of nude black male that bore unmistakable likeness to Ali,
famous boxer); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 130 (Wis.
1979) (finding cause of action when plaintiff's nickname "Crazylegs" used without
authorization).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
71. Id.
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In most cases an appropriation of identity is accomplished
through the use of a person's name or likeness .... In the ab-
senceof a narrower statutory definition, a number of cases have
held that the unauthorized use of other indicia of a person's
identity can infringe the right of publicity... if they are so closely
and uniquely associated with the identity of a particular individ-
ual that their use enables the defendant to appropriate the com-
mercial value of the person's identity.
72
Some courts have followed this theory, and have interpreted the scope of
protection broadly. 73
California, as one of the most concentrated centers for the entertain-
ment industry, has encountered substantial litigation concerning the right
of publicity.74 Not surprisingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit is on the "leading edge" of expanding and broadening the
scope of protection the right provides.75 For example, it was once virtually
impossible to gain protection from the use of a "sound-alike" of a celeb-
rity's voice. 76 In Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 7 7 however, the Ninth Circuit rec-
ognized that the common law right of publicity could be violated by the
use of a voice imitator.78
72. Id. cmt. d.
73. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997) (al-
lowing statutory and common law cause of action involving mechanical robot im-
personations); White, 971 F.2d at 1399 (allowing common law right of publicity
claim).
74. See Clay, supra note 4, at 486 n.12 (noting impact large volumes of celebri-
ties in California have on California publicity law). For various Ninth Circuit cases,
see infra notes 74-101 and accompanying text.
75. See Lobbin, supra note 8, at 158 ("California has been one of a fewjurisdic-
tions on the forefront of protecting the individual's commercial interest in
persona . . ").
76. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 714 (9th Cir.
1970) (denying claim involving unfair competition action based on voice imita-
tion); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 257 (1st Cir. 1962) (denying claim
alleging voice appropriation). Lahrwas one of the earliest cases involving a sound-
alike. See id. (discussing voice appropriation). Bert Lahr was the actor who played
the Cowardly Lion in MGM's 1939 Wizard of Oz, and he also did a number of dis-
tinctive character voices. See id. at 257. He alleged that producers of a commercial
appropriated one of these voices without his permission. See id. at 257. The court
held that New York's privacy statute did not extend protection to appropriation of
voice. See id. at 258; see also Ropski & Marschang, supra note 7, at 91 ("In the past,
right of publicity protection for a celebrity's voice or vocal style was difficult or
impossible to obtain.").
77. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
78. See id. at 463 (allowing common law claim involving voice impersonator).
The court in Midler did not allow a statutory claim of voice misappropriation. See
id. It reasoned that the statutory language only referred to the appropriation of a
"person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness." Id. Therefore, be-
cause the defendants used a sound-alike, and not Midler's actual voice, her claim
under the statute was defeated. See id. (holding there was no statutory right involv-
ing voice appropriation). Midler, however, was allowed to maintain a common law
claim. See id. at 463.
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In Midler, Ford's advertising agency had attempted to contract with
Midler to sing in its commercial. 79 Midler refused, and Ford hired one of
her former back-up singers to sing and to "sound as much as possible like
the Bette Midler record." 80 The court held that "when a well-known
singer's voice is distinctive and is deliberately imitated for a commercial
purpose, unauthorized users of the singer's voice have 'appropriated what
is not theirs' and, thus, may be stopped under California law."8 1 There-
fore, Midler was successful in maintaining a right of publicity cause of ac-
tion against a voice imitator. 82
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.83 followed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Midler
and allowed a voice misappropriation right of publicity claim.84 The
plaintiff, Tom Waits, was a professional singer, songwriter and actor.85 He
had a "unique" singing voice, characterized as "raspy" and "gravelly. ' '8 6
The court found that a commercial made by the defendants, featuring "a
deliberate imitation of Waits' voice," violated Waits' right of publicity.8 7
In determining whether Waits' voice misappropriation claim was valid, the
court first held that, contrary to the defendants' arguments, Midler was
good law and supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Zacchini.88
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,89 is perhaps the beginning of
the broadest interpretation of the "likeness" element to date.90 In White,
the Ninth Circuit found that an advertisement featuring a mechanical
robot could have violated Vanna White's California common law right of
publicity. 9' The advertisement at issue depicted a robot dressed in a wig,
79. See id. at 461.
80. Id.
81. Ropski & Marschang, supra note 7, at 92.
82. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (allowing common law claim).
83. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
84. See id. at 1112 (finding voice misappropriation claim legally sufficient).
85. See id. at 1097 (describing Waits' career).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1098.
88. See id. at 1099-100 (discussing viability of Midler decision). The court re-jected the defendants' argument that Midler was wrongly decided. See id. The
court examined the cases the defendant raised in support of this argument and
concluded, "The cases [the defendant] asserts were 'rightly decided' all predate
Zacchini and other Supreme Court precedent narrowing Sears' and Compco's sweep-
ing preemption principles. In sum, our holding in Midler, upon which Waits' voice
misappropriation claim rests, has not been eroded by subsequent authority." Id. at
1100.
89. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
90. See Frank, supra note 6, at 1115 (noting decision in White was expansive in
interpretation); Clay, supra note 4, at 486 (same).
91. See White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (allowing right of publicity cause of action
without strict "name or likeness" appropriation). The series of advertisements in
White that were at issue depicted a robot whose clothing and jewelry resembled
Vanna White's style. See id. at 1396. The robot itself did not resemble White in
facial features, and Vanna White's name was not used anywhere in the advertise-
ments. See id.
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gown and jewelry reminiscent of Vanna White's style.92 The robot was
depicted in a setting recognizable as the Wheel of Fortune game set, and
the robot was "in a stance for which White is famous. '93 Although the
robot clearly did not look like a human, let alone Vanna White, the court
upheld a common law right of publicity claim. 94 This decision expanded
the definition of "name or likeness" because there was not a risk of anyone
thinking that the robot was actually Vanna White, yet the court allowed
the cause of action.
95
The Ninth Circuit continued this broad interpretation of the right in
Wendt v. Host International, Inc.,96 where the court expanded upon the pro-
tection against mechanical reproduction. 97 The court in White denied
Vanna White a statutory right of publicity under California Civil Code be-
cause they found a lack of similarity between her and the robot.98 In
Wendt, the plaintiffs, actors George Wendt and John Ratzenberger from
the television show "Cheers," sued the defendant, Host International Inc.,
for using animatronics robotic figures modeled after their likenesses.
99
The court allowed the plaintiffs to maintain a common law right of public-
92. See id. at 1396.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 1399 (holding that district court erred by rejecting White's
claim).
95. See id. at 1397 (stating that robot with mechanical features could not be
mistaken as Vanna White, therefore not White's "likeness").
96. 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
97. See id. at 811 (allowing. the plaintiffs' common law and statutory right of
publicity claims surrounding animatronic reproductions of their characters on TV
show to be tried).
98. See White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (requiring actual "likeness" of plaintiff, and
mechanical robot did not adequately satisfy this element). California Civil Code
§ 3344 provides:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness, in any manner .... for purposes of advertising or sell-
ing .... shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons
injured as a result thereof.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344. (West 2000). The court in White found that the defendants
had used a robot with mechanical features, and therefore could not be deemed
White's "likeness." See White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (finding robot was not sufficiently
similar to White). The court, however, left open the situation when a robot might
violate California statutory law. See id. As the court stated, "[w] ithout deciding for
all purposes when a caricature or impressionistic resemblance might become a
'likeness,' we agree ... the robot at issue here was not White's 'likeness.'" Id.
99. See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 809 (discussing plaintiffs' claims of publicity rights).
The defendants in Wendt created animatronic robotic figures based upon the ac-
tors' likenesses and placed the "robots" in airport bars around the country, in a
setting modeled after the television show "Cheers." See id.
17
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ity claim. 10 0 In addition, the court allowed a statutory right of publicity
claim under the California Civil Code. 10 1
The court in Wendt stated that the decision in White had "specifically
held open the possibility that a manikin molded to Vanna White's precise
features . . . might become a likeness for statutory purposes." l0 2 There-
fore, the court concluded that the degree of similarity between the robots
and the plaintiffs was "clearly material to a claim of violation of CAL. Civ.
CODE § 3344."103 In Wendt, the Ninth Circuit went beyond its previous
rulings in determining when a statutory claim would be allowed.10 4
Few circuit courts other than the Ninth Circuit have recognized such
an expansive right of publicity. 105 It is unlikely that animatronics repro-
duction claims would have much success in any other circuit. Other cir-
cuits, such as the Fifth Circuit, however, have recognized a right that
extends beyond a literal "name or likeness" appropriation of identity.
10 6
100. See id. at 811-12 (discussing common law right of publicity claim). In its
analysis of a common law right of publicity claim, the court considered the defend-
ants' argument that the plaintiffs should not be allowed to claim appropriation of
identity, because the robots were meant to portray the identities of the "Cheers"
characters Norm and Cliff, and not the identities of the actors themselves. See id.
at 811. Wendt and Ratzenberger argued that the commercial value that came
from the advertisements was because of the "likenesses" to the actors. See id. The
court reasoned: "While it is true that appellants' fame arose in large part through
their participation in Cheers, an actor or actress does not lose the right to control
the commercial exploitation of his or her likeness by portraying a fictional charac-
ter." Id. (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979)).
101. See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810 (allowing statutory claim because material
facts existed as to "likeness" of robots to plaintiffs).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1395
(9th Cir. 1992) (disallowing statutory claim). A statutory claim under section 3344
of the California Civil Code was much harder for celebrities to prove because only
certain means of appropriation were allowed and listed in the statute. See, e.g.,
Lobbin, supra note 8, at 164-67 (discussing application section 3344 to protection
of persona). On the other hand, the common law right did not contain such nec-
essary elements, and so protected more than the statute. See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v.
General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 415 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing flexibility of
common law compared to statutory law); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,
463-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing common law right of publicity action, but not
statutory claim under section 3344 with voice impersonation); Motschenbacher v.
RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing common
law claim when defendant used photograph of plaintiff's race car, even though
driver was not visible, and name was not appropriated).
105. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's expansive approach, see
supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994) (recog-
nizing right as protecting value associated with name, not name per se); Elvis Pres-
ley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 801 (S.D. Tex. 1996) ("To violate a
plaintiff's right of publicity, however, the defendant must employ an aspect of per-
sona in a manner that symbolizes or identifies the plaintiff, such as the use of a
name, nickname, voice, picture, achievements, performing style, distinctive charac-
teristics or other indicia closely associated with a person."), rev'd on other grounds,
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognizes
only a limited statutory right to privacy and neither a common law nor a
statutory right of publicity.10 7 Celebrities in the Second Circuit are thus
only offered a very limited form of protection.10 8 For example, in Oliveira
v. Frito-Lay Inc.,10 9 the plaintiff was denied a voice "sound-alike" claim be-
cause voice misappropriation was not included in the New York privacy
law statutes. 110 Generally, a plaintiff would only succeed on a claim that
involved his or her name or picture.11 ' The only extension the court
sometimes allows is the use of a "look-a-like." 112
Another controversial area involving the right of publicity is whether
or not the right should be descendible. 113 Many commentators have dealt
with this issue extensively. 114 The issue, however, remains unsettled be-
cause different courts and legislatures have reached different conclu-
141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit reversed a different issue in favor
of the plaintiff. See id. at 193 (reversing district court's denial of injunction).
107. For a further discussion of the Second Circuit's treatment of the protec-
tion of identity, see infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (discussing lack of
recognition of right in New York).
108. See Oliveira v. Frito-Lay Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1455, 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
("To state a claim under the New York Civil Rights Law, plaintiff must allege (1)
the use of her name, portrait or picture (2) for commercial or trade purposes (3)
without written permission.").
109. 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1455 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
110. See id. at 1462 (holding voice misappropriation claim not allowed).
111. See id. (discussing what is allowed under privacy statute).
112. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (allowing
depiction of nude black man seated in corner of boxing rink to be "portrait or
picture"); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 263 (Sup.
Ct. 1984) (allowing claim involving look-a-like); Young v. Greneker Studios, Inc.,
26 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358-59 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (same).
113. See Ropski & Marschang, supra note 7, at 84-86 (discussing conflicting
views regarding inheritability of right of publicity). Ropski and Marschang note
that "[w] hether the right of publicity is descendible to a celebrity's heirs is an issue
which courts have grappled with in far from unanimous ways." Id. at 84; see Shel-
don H. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value
of Personality, 39 VND. L. REv. 1199, 1237 (1986) ("[C]oncentration on
descendibility has diverted the development of the right [of publicity] into tortu-
ous paths and literal dead ends that may lead to more ill-conceived legislation and
further judicial conflict."). But see Burnett, supra note 5, at 184 (discussing trend
towards accepting descendibility). Burnett contends:
The desirability of making the right descendible is questionable, but the
momentum in favor of descendibility seems to have prevailed. In the
words of one commentator, "[a] freely descendible right of publicity for
all individuals is the only approach which truly vindicates the primary
interests protected by the right of publicity." Only practical concerns of
duration and definition remain for future analysis.
Id. (quoting Roberta R. Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?,
17 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 191, 207-09 (1983)).
114. See generally Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the
Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1125-32
(1980) (discussing descendibility issue); Gary M. Ropski, Further Comments on the
Development of the Right of Publicity-A Matter of Life, Death, and Sometimes the First
Amendment, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 278 (1983) (same); Note, An Assessment of the Com-
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sions.115 Examining these conflicting decisions from various circuits
demonstrates the different ways individual circuits treat the right of public-
ity.1 16 In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,1 1 7 the Supreme Court of California
held the right to publicity was not descendible. 118 In Lugosi, Bela Lugosi's
heirs sought to enjoin the defendant from licensing merchandise that por-
trayed Bela Lugosi as Count Dracula.'119 The court denied descendibility
of the right and held that once Lugosi was dead, "his name was in the
public domain .. . [and] [a] nyone . . .could use it for a legitimate com-
mercial purpose." 120 Since then, California has passed section 990 of the
Civil Code, which created "freely transferable property rights in the name,
voice, signature, photograph or likeness of any deceased person provided
any of these attributes had commercial value at the time of the personal-
ity's death."' 2 1
In Tennessee, an appeals court took a different approach.1 22 The
court in State ex rel. Elvis Presley v. Cromwell123 stated that the right of public-
ity was descendible.' 24 There, two not-for-profit corporations were using
Elvis Presley's name in the title of their respective corporations.1 2 5 The
Presley estate had incorporated one business. 126 The court held that the
right of publicity descended to Presley's estate and its respective licen-
sees. 127 In Estate of Presley v. Russen,' 28 yet another case involving Elvis
Presley and his estate, the United States District Court for the District of
mercial Exploitation Requirement as a Limit on the Right of Publicity, 96 HARv. L. REv.
1703 (1983) (same).
115. For a further discussion of the different approaches to the right, see
supra notes 96-112 and accompanying text.
116. For a further discussion of courts' decisions, see infra notes 135-72.
117. 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
118. See id. (determining whether publicity rights become property of heirs
after death).
119. See id. at 427 (discussing plaintiffs' claims).
120. Id. at 430.
121. Hetherington, supra note 4, at 13 (discussing California's treatment of
descendibility issue); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(a), (h) (West Supp. 1993).
122. See generally State ex rel. Elvis Presley v. Cromwell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1987).
123. 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
124. See id. at 92 (finding right to be descendible).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 93.
127. See id. at 92 (concluding that descendible right promoted several of poli-
cies underlying right of publicity). This case overturned an earlier Sixth Circuit
case, which had determined that the right was not descendible. See Memphis Dev.
Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 960 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that right of
publicity is not descendible), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); see also Haines, supra
note 9, at 222-24 (discussing Cromwell case in depth). Haines notes, "[t]he Cromwell
court concluded that a descendible right of publicity promoted several important
policies, including the recognition of the economic value of identity and the prin-
ciple of unjust enrichment." Id. at 224.
128. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
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New Jersey again held that the right of publicity was inheritable because
the right was viewed as a property right.129
In Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heri-
tage Products, Inc.,130 the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the right of
publicity was descendible. 1 3 1 There, the defendant had been marketing
plastic busts of the late Dr. King. 13 2 The court reasoned that "without this
characteristic [descendibility], full commercial exploitation of one's name
and likeness is practically impossible ... without assignability, the right of
publicity could hardly be called a 'right.'
1 3 3
III. HENLEY V. DLi-ARD DEPARTMENT STOREs. ITS PLACE IN THE
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY SPECTRUM
Don Henley, the plaintiff in Henley, sought to enforce his right of pub-
licity against the defendant for misappropriation of his name and likeness
in a newspaper advertisement. 134 Don Henley is a music celebrity, best
known as the founder and member of the band "The Eagles" and for his
successful solo career. The defendant, Dillard Department Stores, ran a
newspaper advertisement on two separate days in 1997 featuring a shirt
known as a "henley." As part of the advertisement, there was a man shown
wearing the "henley" shirt, with the words "This is Don," and "This is
Don's henley," both in the same large print beside the picture with an
arrow pointing towards the man. 13 5
The court began its analysis of Henley's right of publicity claim by
defining the right of publicity and setting forth the three elements that
the Fifth Circuit had previously established as necessary to recover for the
tort of misappropriation. 13 6 Under Texas law the plaintiff must prove
that: "1) the defendant appropriated the plaintiff's name or likeness or
the value associated with it, and not in an incidental manner or for a news-
worthy purpose; 2) the plaintiff can be identified from the publication;
and 3) there was some advantage or benefit to the defendant.' 37 The
court found that the plaintiff had satisfied all three elements and thus
held that there had been an invasion of Henley's right of publicity. 138
129. See id. at 1355 (treating right to publicity like property right).
130. 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
131. See id. at 703 (finding descendibility of right).
132. See id. (discussing facts of case).
133. Id. at 703.
134. See Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 587 (N.D. Tex.
1999) (discussing plaintiffs claim).
135. Id. at 589 (discussing content of advertisement). The advertisement also
contained the statement: "Sometimes Don tucks it in; other times he wears it
loose-it looks great either way. Don loves his henley; you will too." Id. The ad
further identified the defendant, the price of the shirt, and information such as
available sizes. See id. (discussing other details of advertisement).
136. See id. at 590 (discussing tort of misappropriation of name or likeness).
137. Id. at 591.
138. See id. at 597 (discussing holding of court).
2000] NOTE
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IV. DIFFERENT ANSWERS TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY QUESTION IN
DIFFERENT COURTS: CONFUSION IN THE SYSTEM
A. Henley and the Fifth Circuit's Approach to the Right of Publicity
The court began its analysis by examining whether or not the defend-
ant had actually appropriated the plaintiff's name or likeness.' 39 The
court followed other courts' expansive interpretations of "name or like-
ness," and it found that the plaintiffs precise name did not need to be
appropriated, but rather that a phrase or image that clearly identified the
plaintiff was sufficient. 140 The court followed the view that "[a] person's
right of publicity may be violated when a defendant employs an aspect of
that person's persona in a manner that symbolizes or identifies the person,
'such as the use of a name, nickname, voice, picture, performing style,
distinctive characteristics or other indicia closely associated with a per-
son."' 141 Based on this, the court found that "Don's henley" did indeed
clearly identify plaintiff Don Henley.142
Further, the court found that the defendant's appropriation of Hen-
ley's name and likeness was not incidental. 14 3 The court based its decision
on the defendant's testimony at deposition.1 44 The designer of the adver-
tisement admitted that she used the play on Don Henley's name to make
the ad more interesting.145 The court rejected the defendant's argument
that the phrase was merely used for "fun," and held that the words "Don's
henley" could not have been meant for any other purpose than to attract
attention to Dillard's advertisement.146 In discussing whether or not Hen-
ley could be identified from the advertisement, the court looked only at
139. See id. at 591.
140. See id. (discussing fact that cause of action not limited to name or
likeness).
141. Id. (quoting Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 801 (S.D.
Tex. 1996)).
142. See Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (holding same). The court went on to
say that "because the use of the expression 'Don's henley' is so clearly recognizable
as a likeness of Plaintiff, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude
that the phrase 'Don's henley' does not clearly identify the Plaintiff, Don Henley."
Id.
143. See id. at 592-93.
144. See id. at 593 (discussing depositional testimony, and finding that use was
not incidental).
145. See id. (comparing "play on words" in this case to expression used in
Carson). The defendant in Carson rented and sold "Here's Johnny" portable toi-
lets. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir.
1983). He combined this phrase with "'The World's Foremost Commodian"' to
"'make a good play on a phrase."' Id. "Here's Johnny" was a phrase associated with
the plaintiff's opening as host of the Tonight Show. See id. The court found that
the phrase "Here's Johnny" was sufficiently identifiable to the plaintiff, Johnny
Carson, and, consequently, found that his right of publicity had been violated. See
id. at 836.
146. See Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 593 (finding use of Henley's identity was not
incidental).
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the evidence presented by the plaintiff, which showed, through use of a
survey, that the plaintiff was recognized by more than a "de minimus
number of persons." 14
7
The Henley court followed prior court decisions to decide whether the
defendant benefited from the use of Don Henley's identity.' 48 To prove
that there was an advantage or benefit, a plaintiff must prove that the
"[d]efendant derived some commercial benefit from the use of [the]
plaintiff's name or likeness as opposed to deriving no commercial benefit
due to the fact that the use was incidental."' 49 The court rejected the
defendant's argument that the plaintiff must prove the defendant made
money from the advertisement. 150 In determining whether there was a
147. Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 595. The court used the standard as set forth by
J. Thomas McCarthy, which states: "[t]o establish liability, plaintiff need prove no
more than that he or she is reasonably identifiable in defendant's use to more than
a de minimus number of persons." J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC-
ITY AND PRIVACY § 3.4 [A] (1998). McCarthy, one of the leading commentators on
the right of publicity, suggests elements that would be necessary to prove an in-
fringement claim for a right of publicity. See id. (discussing what threshold levels
should be met for "right of publicity claim"). The court in Henley looked to McCar-
thy as a source for guidance on a number of elements in the case. See Henley, 46 F.
Supp. 2d at 595, 597.
In discussing the "identifiable" element in an action for right of publicity in-
fringement, McCarthy states that the "plaintiff as a human being must be 'identifi-
able' from the total context of the defendant's use." McCARTHY, supra, § 3.2.
McCarthy further states that "the intent, state of mind and degree of knowledge of
a defendant may shed light on the identifiably issue." Id. In considering the evi-
dence, the Henley court found that it was "undisputed that defendant intended to
appropriate Don Henley's identity and intended that consumers associate the ad
with Don Henley." Heney, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
148. See Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (following RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652C cmt. d (1977)). The comment states that "[i]t is only when the
publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant's benefit the
commercial or other values associated with the name or likeness that the right of
privacy is invaded." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. d (1977). The
court in Henley followed Matthews and determined that the benefit element re-
quired some type of commercial benefit, as opposed to no commercial benefit due
to incidental usage. See Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (analyzing benefit element);
see also Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994) (analyzing benefit
in terms of comment d of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C); Polsby v.
Spruill, No. CIV.96-1641, 1997 WL 680550, at *1, *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1997) (dis-
cussing what is required for benefit to exist).
149. Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
150. See id. at 597 (rejecting defendant's argument that plaintiff must show
defendant made money from commercial use). The court relied on previous deci-
sions, the Restatements, and on a legal commentator:
Requiring Plaintiff to prove Defendant's ad was profitable was not con-
templated by the drafters of the Restatement, nor has it been suggestd by
the Fifth Circuit or the Ninth Circuit, the appellate court most frequently
confronted with this issue. Further, one of the foremost legal commenta-
tors on the Right of Publicity, J. Thomas McCarthy... never suggests...
requir[ing] a plaintiff to prove that a defendant made a profit or secured
a tangible benefit.
Id. (citing McCARTHY, supra note 147, §§ 2.3, 6.12, 8.8, 8.9).
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benefit, the court focused on the defendant's intent.15 1 This was not diffi-
cult to discern because the defendant's own employees admitted that they
meant to use Henley's name (or wordplay on his name) to attract atten-
tion.1 5 2 Considering this admission, the court found that the defendant
intended to benefit from the use of Henley's identity.1 53
As a result, the court held that the defendant had indeed appropri-
ated Henley's name or likeness for its value, that Henley could be identi-
fied from the ad and that Dillard derived a benefit from the use of
Henley's name. 15 4 Based on these conclusions, the court held that Dillard
Department Stores violated Henley's right of publicity. 1 55
B. Conflicting Decisions Among the Courts
The decision in Henley is consistent with Fifth Circuit cases that have
dealt with the right of publicity. 15 6 Further, the Fifth Circuit's approach
to the scope of protection under the right is consistent with the expansive
approach employed by the Ninth Circuit. 157 In fact, the court in Henley
looked to Ninth Circuit decisions to analyze the plaintiffs claim. 5 8 The
decisions being made within the Fifth Circuit concerning the right of pub-
licity, however, have not gone beyond the bounds of reason.1 59
The Fifth Circuit has not gone as far as the Ninth Circuit in broaden-
ing the scope of protection under the right of publicity. 160 For instance,
in White, the Ninth Circuit found that a robot could be construed as a
151. See id. at 596 (citing Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir.
1997)).
152. See id. at 593 (admitting invocation of Henley's persona to make adver-
tisement interesting).
153. See id.
154. See id. at 597 (finding defendant derived benefit from Henley's identity).
155. See id.
156. See generally Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994) (defin-
ing elements of cause of action for publicity rights violations in Texas); Elvis Pres-
ley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 801 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (following Texas
right of publicity law), rev'd, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
157. See generally White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.
1992) (allowing cause of action involving robotic representation), rehg denied, 989
F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993); Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (allowing right of pub-
licity claim not directly involving name or likeness).
158. See Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (noting Ninth Circuit is involved in right
of publicity cases most frequently). The court rejected the defendant's argument
to adopt an interpretation of benefit that required profit or tangible benefit. See
id. (holding that actual profit did not need to exist). In doing so, the court ar-
gued: "requiring Plaintiff to prove Defendant's ad was profitable was not contem-
plated by the drafters of the Restatement, nor has it been suggested by the Fifth
Circuit or the Ninth Circuit, the appellate court most frequently confronted with
this issue." Id.
159. See, e.g., Matthews, 15 F.3d at 437 (setting forth elements needed for right
of publicity claim, and denying plaintiffs claim).
160. Compare Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (ex-
panding interpretation of right to include mechanical likenesses), with Matthews,
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"likeness" although it is seemingly clear that a robot could never be mis-
taken for an actual celebrity.' 6 ' The Ninth Circuit continued to follow
this liberal interpretation involving -mechanical reproductions of celebri-
ties in Wendt. In Wendt, plaintiffs George Wendt and John Ratzenberger,
actors that played Norm and Cliff respectively on the TV show "Cheers,"
had a right of publicity claim when robotic caricatures of their TV charac-
ters were used in airport bars around the country.162
The Ninth Circuit, however, stands alone in interpreting the right so
broadly. 163 In fact, other circuits have failed to recognize a right where
other circuits would clearly find one. 164 For example, New York does not
recognize a specific right of publicity.' 65 Therefore, if a celebrity wishes to
bring a cause of action, he or she must couch it in terms of the privacy
statutes that do exist. 16 6
In Oliveira the plaintiff, Astrud Oliveira, otherwise known as Astrud
Gilberto, brought a cause of action because her voice was used without her
permission in an advertisement. 16 7 Gilberto recorded the song, "The Girl
from Ipanema," in 1964.168 In 1996, the defendant, Frito-Lay, produced a
television commercial featuring "Miss Piggy" from the Muppets eating
"Baked Lays" while "singing" along to "The Girl from Ipanema."169
Among her other claims, Gilberto argued that the advertisement was "a
violation of [her] right to publicity as protected by New York Civil Rights
Law Sections 50, 51."170 These statutory provisions do not recognize a
right of publicity per se, but rather a limited right of privacy. 171 The court
concluded that Gilberto's claim failed because "no look-a-like or recogniz-
able representation of the plaintiff [was] present in the commercial. " 172
15 F.3d at 437 (stating elements needed for right of publicity claim and strictly
applying them).
161. See White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (noting same).
162. See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 806 (applying broad interpretation of publicity
right to mechanical likeness of celebritites).
163. For a further discussion of the breadth of Ninth Circuit decisions, see
supra note 73, 83-101 and accompanying text.
164. For a further discussion of the decisions of other circuits, see supra notes
156-63, infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Oliveira v. Frito-Lay Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1455 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(denying cause of action because New York does not recognize right of publicity).
. .166. See id. at 1462 (discussing right to privacy); Robinson, supra note 5, at
200 (noting that New York does not recognize common law right of publicity).
167. See Oliveira, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1457 (discussing facts of case).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 1462 (discussing limited right to privacy under New York statu-
tory law). To "state a claim under the New York Civil Rights Law, plaintiff must
allege (1) the use of her name, portrait or picture (2) for commercial or trade
purposes (3) without written permission." Id.
172. Id.
NOTE
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The court further held that the New York statutes excluded voice misap-
propriation and, therefore, dismissed Gilberto's claim. 173
If this case were brought in the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff clearly
would have a viable claim. 174 Both Midler and Waits illustrate that voice
imitation is protected under a right of publicity, thereby producing a dif-
ferent result.175
It is thus clear that the circuit courts are producing conflicting deci-
sions. 176 When issues involving the right of publicity arise, various meth-
ods of interpretation may control involving either the common law, state
right of publicity statutes, state right of privacy statutes or no particular law
at all. 1 7 7 A plaintiff might win a case involving voice imitation in Califor-
nia, but lose the same case in New York. 178 This disparity might en-
courage practices such as forum shopping. 179
C. The Right of Publicity and First'Amendment Concerns
Any analysis of the right of publicity doctrine directly implicates the
First Amendment.18 0 The Framers of the Constitution designed the First
173. See id. (discussing inapplicability of voice imitation).
174. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992) (cit-
ing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988)) ("We recognized in
Midler that when voice is a sufficient indicia of a celebrity's identity, the right of
publicity protects against its imitation for commercial purposes without the celeb-
rity's consent."); Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (allowing voice misappropriation as viola-
tion of right of publicity).
175. For a further discussion of Ninth Circuit voice misappropriation deci-
sions, see supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
176. For a further discussion of these conflicting decisions, see supra notes
143-64 and accompanying text.
177. For a further discussion of various approaches to the right to protect
one's identity, see supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
178. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1093 (allowing voice misappropriation claim);
Oliveira, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1455 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1997) (denying cause of action
involving voice misappropriation).
179. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 201 (discussing whether jurisdiction rec-
ognizing right of publicity "encourages forum shopping, and discourages publicity
rights owners and creators from residing in certain jurisdictions").
180. See Halpern, supra note 4, at 867 ("By its nature, the right of publicity
implicates speech: whatever else it may be, the right of publicity involves a commu-
nicative tort. Of course, such a characterization merely starts-and does not re-
solve-a First Amendment inquiry."); Hetherington, supra note 4, at 21 ("The most
forceful argument against a wholesale extension of the right of publicity can be
found in the First Amendment's policy of promoting the free flow of ideas essen-
tial to vigorous public discourse."). Hetherington argues that the First Amend-
ment does not act as an absolute limitation on the right of publicity. See id. at 21-
22; see also Haines, supra note 9, at 225-226 (explaining when conflict occurs be-
tween right of publicity and First Amendment). Haines states:
By protecting the freedoms of speech and the press, the First Amend-
ment promotes democratic self-government, facilitates the search for
truth, and protects the free flow of information through such media as
magazines, newspapers, television, and film. At the same time, the right
of publicity creates an exclusive right in an individual to the commercial
[Vol. 45: p. 169
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Amendment to protect the freedoms of speech and the press.' 8 1 An indi-
vidual's right of publicity could potentially be violated in areas that are
protected by the First Amendment. 18 2 The First Amendment, however,
has not been given a great deal of attention in courts' right of publicity
analyses.' 8 3 Where courts have faced a conflict between the First Amend-
ment and the "right of publicity," most have examined whether the use of
identity was purely commercial or a use of free speech that was pro-
tected. 184 This conflict has the potential to create challenging situations
use of his or her identity. The First Amendment and the right of public-
ity conflict when a person commercially benefits from a constitutionally
protected use of another's identity.
Id.
181. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." Id.
182. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 198 ("The right of publicity might be po-
tentially infringed by news, fiction, commercial speech, or some combination of
the three. Each category represents a different level of First Amendment protec-
tion."). Commercial speech is afforded the lowest level of First Amendment pro-
tection. See id.
183. See Frank, supra note 6, at 1136 (discussing lack of court attention to
right of publicity analysis); Halpern, supra note 4, at 868 (discussing same). Frank
discusses the fact that the reason most courts do not consider First Amendment
concerns is because courts do not generally view the plaintiff as seeking to with-
hold appropriation of identity altogether. See Frank, supra note 6, at 1136. She
argues that courts tend to fall back on the logic expressed in Zacchini. See id.
Frank states that courts view an individual as merely seeking compensation for use
of his or her identity. See id. In Zacchini, the court expressed this view: "Petitioner
does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance; he simply wants to be
paid for it." Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
The majority in Zacchini felt that First Amendment concerns of freedom of expres-
sion need not be addressed, because plaintiffs were not trying to prevent their
identity from being in the public sphere. See id. They simply wished to be paid for
the use of their identity. See id. Further, as Frank notes, "[t]he other major block
towards recognizing a First Amendment defense in these [right of publicity] cases
has been the slight protection granted commercial speech." Frank, supra note 6, at
1136. In other words, when a commercial interest is involved, the level of First
Amendment protection is lowered, and the defendant will have a harder time
proving his right to freedom of expression has been violated. See generally Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (stating that commercial speech is entitled to minimal First Amendment
protection).
184. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of
RealPeople by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1596 (1979)) ("The purpose of the me-
dia's use of a person's identity is central. If the purpose is 'informative or cultural'
the use is immune; 'if it serves no such function but merely exploits the individual
portrayed, immunity will not be granted."'); see also Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v.
Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d
Cir. 1982). The court in Groucho Marx noted:
As a general rule, if the defendants' works are designed primarily to pro-
mote the dissemination of thoughts, ideas or information through news
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in balancing First Amendment policies and the policies underlying the
right of publicity.' 8
5
The Supreme Court directly balanced the First Amendment and a
right of publicity in Zacchini. In Zacchini, the Court held that the First
Amendment did not protect a news station's right to broadcast Hugo
Zacchini's entire "human cannonball" performance.'3 6 The facts in
Zacchini were unusual and the Court was careful to specifically limit the
or fictionalization, the right of publicity gives way to protected expres-
sion .... If, however, the defendants' use of the celebrity's name or
likeness is largely for commercial purposes, such as the sale of merchan-
dise, the right of publicity prevails.
Id. But see Haines, supra note 9, at 227 (discussing whether use commercial or
protected free speech). Haines argues that this particular approach is flawed be-
cause "[t]he concepts of 'commercial' use and 'protected (or newsworthy) free
speech use ... present significant analytical problems because no uniform defini-
tion of 'commercial use' has emerged from the case law." Id.; see Frank, supra note
6, at 1136 (discussing First Amendment concerns). Frank states that:
As shown in White, the finding of any amount of commercial motivation is
virtually the kiss of death to a First Amendment defense, even one based
on an intent to parody the original. Even in the exalted field of news
reporting, it is difficult to conceive of a pure appropriation of publicity,
untainted by commercial avarice.
Frank, supra note 6, at 1136. In the February 26, 1999 edition of the New York Law
Journal, the cover of a New Yorker magazine is discussed as something that falls
within the gray area between "commercial" and "newsworthy." See -enerally Ferri &
Gibbons, supra note 9 (discussing cover). The cover discussed was the February 8,
1999 issue of the New Yorker, which featured a picture of Leonardo Da Vinci's
famous portrait of the "Mona Lisa" with Monica Lewinsky's face superimposed. See
id. at 38 (describing cover of magazine). The authors argue:
Although this ironic, controversial cover undoubtedly heightened con-
sumer interest in New Yorker magazine, the publisher would likely escape
liability for any right of publicity action brought by Ms. Lewinsky. This is
so because Ms. Lewinsky currently figures prominently in the news, in
light of the current impeachment proceedings against President Clinton,
and the New Yorker issue does contain news and commentary concerning
the proceedings.
Id.
185. See Halpern, supra note 4, at 868 (discussing First Amendment concerns
and right of publicity). Halpern explains:
[A]t the outer edges of the right of publicity, there may be challenging
questions of policy. For example, imitation and impersonation create dif-
ficult issues; interests must be balanced in order to protect the personality
interest from appropriation while preserving the equally deserving areas
of parody, satire, and self-conscious impersonation.
Id.; see Robinson, supra note 5, at 198 ("Weighing First Amendment principles
against the right of publicity is a difficult task.").
186. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575 (determining First Amendment does not
"immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his
consent"). The Court went on to say:
There is not doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First
Amendment protection. It is also true that entertainment itself can be
important news. But it is important to note that neither the public nor
respondent will be deprived of the benefit of petitioner's performance as
long as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized.
Id. at 578.
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scope of its decision.' 87 The Court did not "deliberately or otherwise...
establish a general test balancing the right of publicity against First
Amendment freedoms." 18 8
In the absence of a clear balancing test, First Amendment concerns
have generally proven unfounded due to limitations placed on the right of
publicity by courts and legislatures. 189 The Restatement of the Law of Un-
fair Competition limits the right of publicity, generally excluding the right
when "the use of a person's identity [is] in news reporting, commentary,
entertainment, or in works of fiction or nonfiction or in advertising that is
incidental to such uses."1 90
In situations where courts have found a violation of an individual's
right of publicity, recognition of the right only when there was an exploita-
tive use of the identity.19 ' The court in Henley never reached a First
Amendment issue because the advertisement involved was strictly commer-
cial and because Texas law limits the publicity right to protect freedom of
speech values. 192 In Matthews v. Wozencraft, 19 3 another leading Fifth Cir-
cuit right of publicity case, First Amendment values acted as a limita-
tion.' 94 In Matthews, the court held that a novel containing a fictionalized
187. See id. at 574-75 ("Wherever the line in particular situations is to be
drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are
quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media
when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent.").
188. Robinson, supra note 5, at 197-98; see Burnett, supra note 5, at 192 (dis-
cussing vagueness of Zacchini decision in terms of First Amendment limitations).
189. See Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (N.D. Tex.
1999) (outlining elements for tort of misappropriation of name or likeness in
Texas). The first element limits the right of publicity so that First Amendment
values are still protected by excluding "incidental uses" and uses for "newsworthy
purposes." Id. at 590; see Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir.
1983) ("The California Supreme Court has subjected the 'right of publicity' under
California law to a narrowing interpretation which accords with First Amendment
values."); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 461-62 (Cal. 1979)
(Bird, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he right of publicity has not been held to outweigh
the value of free expression. Any other conclusion would allow . . .prominent
persons to be subject to censorship under the guise of preventing the dissipation
of the publicity value of a person's identity."); Burnett, supra note 5, at 193 (dis-
cussing "newsworthiness" and "incidental use" exceptions placed on misappropria-
tion tort by courts); Haines, supra note 9, at 226 n.102 (listing state publicity
statutes limiting right of publicity where conflicts with First Amendment and stat-
utes failing to incorporate limitations).
190. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995).
191. See Halpern, supra note 4, at 868 ("The right of publicity does not reach
beyond the interest it is designed to protect, i.e., the associative value, the hard
economic commercial value of an individual's identity, and thus is limited to com-
mercially exploitative uses.").
192. See Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 589 (citing that advertisement was run spe-
cifically to feature "henley" shirt that could be bought at defendant's department
store).
193. 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994).
194. See id. at 440 (denying claim on basis of free speech principles of First
Amendment).
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account of true events occurring in the plaintiffs life as an undercover
narcotics officer fell under First Amendment protection, even if he met all
of the elements of a right of publicity claim. 195
In decisions following Zacchini, First Amendment concerns have pre-
empted right of publicity interests.19 6 When faced with a conflict between
the two interests, "courts almost invariably subordinate the interests pro-
tected by the right of publicity to competing free speech interests."1 97
V. A FEDERAL RIGHT OF PUBLICITY STATUTE: A POSSIBLE ANSWER TO
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY QUESTIONS
The right of publicity has its place in the judicial system. 198 In mod-
ern society, certain individuals have gained a public persona from which
they derive much of their livelihood. 199 Courts recognize this and have,
on the whole, accepted the idea of a right of publicity.200 Yet many circuit
courts approach the right differently.2 0 This divergence creates a conflict
among judicial decisions. 20 2 As a result, "a celebrity who claims a right of
publicity infringement may have a vast array of laws upon which to seek
protection."2 0 3 This abundant availability could encourage practices such
as forum shopping by plaintiffs and might even encourage or discourage
195. See id. (holding novel that contained fictionalized account of true events
involving undercover police officer fell within protection of First Amendment).
The court stated that "[e]ven if Matthews has created a genuine issue of material
fact on his misappropriation claim, Wozencraft is entitled to summaryjudgment as
a matter of law because of free speech and public domain defenses." Id.
196. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d
959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that First Amendment preempted Oklahoma's
right of publicity statute where parody baseball cards were commercially sold);
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that right of public-
ity is preempted when balanced with First Amendment interests); New York Maga-
zine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 987 F. Supp. 254, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (invoking First
Amendment in denying attempt to stop commercial exploitation of New York City
Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani's name); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that First Amendment took precedence over
plaintiffs publicity rights).
197. Haines, supra note 9, at 226.
198. See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(recognizing right of publicity as valid).
199. See, e.g., id. at 576 (recognizing entertainer's livelihood comes from activ-
ity that gives entertainer his reputation). For a further discussion of the economic
value of a celebrity's identity, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
200. For a further discussion ofjudicial recognition of the right of publicity,
see supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
201. For examples of different approaches taken by the courts, see supra
notes 62-133 and accompanying text.
202. For a further discussion of the judicial conflict, see supra notes 62-133
and accompanying text.
203. Ropski & Marschang, supra note 7, at 99 (noting that, because of unde-
fined nature of right of publicity, there are many variations of laws under which
celebrities will seek protection).
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individuals' particular choices of residence, depending on the jurisdiction
in question.
20 4
To create uniformity among court decisions, Congress should enact a
federal statute dealing specifically with the right of publicity. One com-
mentator argues that "[a] right of public identity statute would benefit the
public, the judiciary, and those who invest time, effort, and money in their
personal identities." 20 5 If this holds true, such a statute would solve judi-
cial.conflicts and prevent aberrations like forum shopping.20 6 A federal
right to publicity statute should set forth boundaries for the right of pub-
licity, and not specifically list what should and should not be included in
the right.20 7 Without such clear boundaries, advertisers can easily find
ways to exploit a person's identity without violating an individual's right of
publicity because technology is advancing so quickly that it would not be
possible to include in a statute all varieties of commercial use.
2 08
Further, any statute that is developed must be defined to prevent con-
flict between First Amendment rights and the right of publicity.2 09 One
commentator suggests that "the courts would do well to limit the scope of
the right of publicity and temper it in a direction more amenable to the
First Amendment."2 10 This general concern that the right of publicity
may soon impermissibly infringe upon areas constitutionally protected by
204. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 201 (discussing gap and consequences of
legal conflict). Robinson discusses cases like Wendt and Oliveira, and concludes
that "these decisions graphically underscore the inevitable, ever widening conflict
between the circuits regarding the right of publicity." Id.
205. Id. at 201-02. Robinson gives a detailed analysis of the elements that
should be considered in developing a statute. See id. at 201-07 (proposing analy-
sis); see Hetherington, supra note 4, at 4 ("A sharply defined right of publicity
would provide needed certainty in legitimate commercial transactions involving
celebrities, advertisers and entertainment concerns while helping guard against
overreaching that would unduly restrict public access to and enjoyment of our
popular culture."). This call for a standardized right of publicity has been made by
a number of commentators. See, e.g., Lobbin, supra note 8, at 193 ("[T]he right of
publicity should be brought under one definition-it should be one right. And,
although the legislature has caused much of the present discontinuity, a legislative
solution seems more appropriate than a judicial one.").
206. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 201 (discussing whether undefined nature
of right of publicity will encourage practices like forum-shopping).
207. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.
1992) ("A rule which says that the right of publicity can be infringed only through
the use of nine different methods of appropriating identity merely challenges the
clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth."), rehg denied, 989 F.2d 1512
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).
208. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) (in-
volving mechanical reproductions of plaintiffs); White, 971 F.2d at 1398 (involving
robot version of plaintiff).
209. See Burnett, supra note 5, at 191 ("The right of publicity must be
crafted . . . providing the breathing space necessary for free speech rights to
flourish.").
210. Frank, supra note 6, at 1141.
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the First Amendment makes it clear that a federal statute is necessary to
limit the expansion of the right.2 11
Certain broad considerations should be accounted for by the recom-
mended statute as well. 2 12 The elements of identity enumerated in previ-
ous case law and the Restatements should be considered when developing
the statute.213 In addition, creators of the statute should keep in mind the
rapid technological advances taking place. As a result of these advances,
the statutory language should be fluid enough to account for unpredict-
able scenarios. In essence, the statute should not shock legal rules already
in place, but rather embody the concept of an identity having a "value"
that should be protected.2 14
Without a workable federal statute, the result is ongoing ambiguity. 215
As it stands now, an individual involved in a case concerning his or her
right of publicity cannot be certain of the outcome. 216 With a federal stat-
ute, this uncertainty would be abolished. It would both eliminate the split
among the courts and enable this area of the law to mature. After all,
protection under a right of publicity is essential in today's media-driven,
commercial world.
Eleanor Johnson
211. See, e.g., id. at 1115 (arguing that "serious efforts must be made to limit
the encroachment of this personal property right upon First Amendment rights of
free expression").
212. For an in-depth discussion of what the federal statute should take into
consideration, see Robinson, supra note 5, at 202-04 (suggesting elements of stat-
ute) and Lobbin, supra note 8, at 193 (calling for legislative solution to make defi-
nition of right of publicity uniform).
213. See, e.g., Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (N.D.
Tex. 1999) ("A person's right of publicity may be violated when a defendant em-
ploys an aspect of that person's persona in a manner that symbolizes or identifies
the person, 'such as the use of a name, nickname, voice, picture, performing style,
distinctive characteristics or other indicia closely associated with a person."')
(quoting Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 801 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
214. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 203-04 ("Far from presenting a novelty in
the law, the statute would simply constitute an acceptance of the inherent value of
identity, a concept reinforced by forty years of case law.").
215. For a further discussion of the ambiguity that surrounds the right of pub-
licity, see supra notes 62-133, 139-79 and accompanying text.
216. For a further discussion of the uncertainty of the outcome, see supra
notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
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